On January 27, 2008 in the RSPP Hospital – Jakarta, a former president and the ruler of the Indonesian New Order has passed away. He leaves so many legacies, not only the memory of prosperous economic Indonesia in the past, but also the problem of authoritarianism that created fearness bystate which until now still complicated to solve. The judicial disputes for example corruption alleged, human right violation, and the abuse of power is a few problem that still debatable in the court. Besides the negative side (the failure and past mistakes owning by the Soeharto’s administration) there are positive side that (may be) affected by the people of Indonesia in the present day-to-day politics are lacked to feeling. The New Order’s Soeharto has shown the stability, security, and development. Something that in present day difficult to see.
Strong Government
The Soeharto’s administration able to bring the political stability and the economic growth because this administration are supported by the strong leadership and backed-up by the military as one pillar of the New Order fundament of bureaucracy. With Golkar as political machine (in the context of maintenance the vote-gathering and civilian-base bureaucrat), the military played important role to keep the status quo. So the developmentalism of New Order keeps going and spread across the nation.
The value of Armed Forces in the Soeharto perspectives is meaningful. Soeharto are the most senior military officer in the Army on the post 1965 decade, where the chaos threaten State, the only organized power in thus era that ready to take over after the failure of Soekarno’s manage-states is only the military. Why military? Not only because the “Dwifungsi” doctrine [ABRI’s dual function doctrine of fighting external enemies and participating in domestic security and politics] but also the civilians are unprepared to take over. The economic instability not only creates the political ruptures, but also impact to the national succession. Theabsent of middle class in the 1965 decadehad rising the more solid military intelligentsia as a response to the civilian failure to take control of the state operators. As the most senior services in the Armed Forces, the Army dominance put their officer to fill the succession of national leader.
The important question in this paper, the author noted that in the 1965 decade, Soeharto military ranks still Major General (that later increased into Lieutenant General), several level behind the General A. H. Nasution (as later Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Peoples Assembly), why in the final destination Soeharto became the most senior in the Army and pass the President of Indonesia? To see the rivalry and the march of Soeharto career, is not only just see the objective ranks and tour of duty the Armed Force apparatus, but also the other instrument that some scholar called “intelligence analysis”.[1]
The rise of Soeharto in post 1965
To see the dynamics in the internal army friction, we must traced back to the early 1960 as Salim Said (2006) wrote that the political involvement of the Indonesian military during the independence revolution, are impact to the contemporary Indonesian politics.
Beginning in 1957, martial law legalized the entry of the officers into politics. But Lt. Gen. Nasution –who had been reinstated as the Army Chief of Staff in 1955- still needed a doctrine to justify the political role of the military in term of its own history and experiences. In 1957, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamijoyo had proclaimed nationwide martial law. The reasons for this state of siege were the developments in the regions and vis-à-vis the capital. The bad relations developing between the center and the regions ultimately ended in the PRRI rebellion in several parts of the country.[2]
Martial law gave the military an opportunity to exercise more power. Together with the President Soekarno, who under the parliamentary government was constitutionally weak but personally very influential, the military initiated a return to the strong presidential system of the revolutionary period. In 1958, after being returned as the Chief-of-Staff of the Army in 1955, Nasution had declared in November 12, 1958 the soldiers “Middle Way” principle. The declaration by Nasution was on speeches without text in the annual celebration of cadet ceremony in Military Academy, Magelang.[3]
The problem of civil-military relation in Indonesia’s post independence period is highly politicized of the Armed Forces (TNI) by President Soekarno. To balance the domestic stability, in the political system, Soekarno adopted the politics of NASAKOM (Nasionalis-Agama-Komunis — Nationalist-Religion-Communist) to keep the national entity balance based on political sect (politik aliran).
Besides the several of ideological thought in the political system, there is the power exist in guided democracy era. There are: first, the element of President RI, there is Ir. Soekarno as Chief of State, Chief of Government, Prime Minister, Great Leader of Revolution, and long-life President. The member of Dwikora Cabinet included to this element.
Second, the element of internal Army. Army separated by the influences of clique between Nasution (Lt. Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution) faction and Yani (Lt. Gen. Ahmad Yani) faction. Soeharto, in the beginning include with the Nasution faction, although later leave and build the independent clique.
And Third, PKI with all of onderbouw organization under communist influences. Forces with three millions member of core PKI as a party, and supported by more than seventies millions of member onderbouw organizations. With this estimates, PKI is a third ranks Communist party in the world under China Peoples Republic and Soviet Union. In the 1955 general election, PKI had four ranks result and placed their minister in the Dwikora Cabinets. Closed with inner cycle of Soekarno’s power, PKI becoming the brightest star and scariest element for the communist opponent.
This condition getting worse, with the friction in the Army (AD), where the General A.H. Nasution as Chief-of-Staff of the Army didn’t like the affair between Soekarno and PKI. The anti-communist view of Nasution carries involving in the behind-scene of regions rebellion supporters. The case of Dewan Banteng (Buffalo Council) and Dewan Gajah (Elephant Council) in South Sumatra. In the beginning, this council just a mass-supporting beam by the Nasution clique, but in the grass-roots, they later declaring self as an opposition of government. This is caused because they do not like to see the intimate relations between Soekarno with PKI.
The Nasution’s clique not only provokes the civilian mass, but also influences the high rank military officers to support his movement. The method is by infiltrate the Perjuangan Pembebasan Irian Barat—West Irian liberation Movement with build Front National Movement that played in the political activity. This is the first involvement of military in the political realm. In the other sides, Nasution supporting mass sympathy with build BKS that involved peasant, youth, and political party under influences of Army. So, this is a regional-level warfare doctrine because using the struggle of liberation West Papua until the village districts.
Soekarno’s administration knew that Nasution is play-director behind this movement. Soekarno think that Nasution movement will bring the Armed Force became “state- within-the state”. So he limited the Nasution role in the Army and put Nasution into boxes with just responsible in the administration only and not leaves Him to interfere the soldier operational, although he still take hold of the current position. With the promoting Lt. Gen. Ahmad Yani as Menpangad (Army Minister), the format duty is to lead the Army. But besides his formal duty, he got a special assignment of President Soekarno to limited the Nasution clique’s by replaced the Pangdam (Regions Commander) which later known as “Nasution man’s”. It’s like “intelligence operation”. These conditions make the relations between Nasution and Yani getting worse.[4]
In the political realm, in the end of 1963s, Soekarno and Soebandrio (Deputy I Prime-Minister) replaced the Nasution’s position from Chief-of-Staff of the Army into just “Presidential Adviser”. The last, Nasution’s influences in the PARAN (Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara—some commission of anti corruption investigation founded by Nasution) disband and changed into KONTRAR (Komando Tertinggi Retooling Aparatur Revolusi— Highest Command of Replacing Revolution’s Apparatus), headed by Soebandrio, and to Strengthen, Yani appoint by Soekarno as Chief-of-Staff KONTRAR. At least, Nasution’s influences in the real politics (military and politics) are fading away.
This condition frightens the Armed Forces leaders. They afraid, if the conflict penetrated into grass-root soldiers. If this happened, the PKI will get the benefit. So, they asked Soekarno to reconcile Nasution and Yani. Soekarno appoint Maj. Gen. Soeharto and East Java Military Commander, Brig. Gen. Basuki Rachmad go to meet Nasution. The duty is to suggest Nasution to adapt the tour-of-duty and do not contrary with the President appointment.
This reconciliation is not easy. From several meeting scheduled, both of Nasution and Yani never attended the meeting, they just sent their adviser. In meeting on the mid April 1965s, attended by 200 high officers in the Army Headquarters, they (at least) doesn’t come (the means that this meeting failed to reconcile both generals), but this meeting declaring the new Army doctrine, called “Catur Ubaya Cakti” concepted by Maj. Gen. Soeharto. The point is a declaration of loyalty and honest-promise of Army Soldiers, which in substance the TNI as one of the force element of state have rights to give an unlimited suggestion and political duty to the President.[5]
This doctrine was rising the new worried in the circle of political elites and intellectual society; because the Army is clear defend the “state-within the-state politics”. This doctrine implied that Armed Forces had independent authority to control their own resources and won’t interfere by the external. This doctrine also consequence Soeharto as the new rising star within the Armed Forces officers, that in this era bridging the two strong personalities (Nasution and Yani) which the most senior officers in the Armed Forces.
With the lacked influence of senior officer above Soeharto (as the consequence of friction the Army by Yani and Nasution), Soeharto had chance to start unifying the internal Army with build his own clique. This condition implied that Soekarno doesn’t have choice in the post 1965 tragedy (which Yani and others high officer were killed) to give Soeharto a wider authority to restore and command the security as Pangkopkamtib which Nasution (as the highest officers) it self were untrusted by Soekarno.
In the realm of constitution, the issued of an extra-judicial and ad-hoc institution like Pangkopkamtip are unconstitutional because it dismissed the regular norms and political ethics. In the tragedy of September 30, 1965, after the kidnapped of General Yani, the President as the supreme commander should replace the Yani position (as Menpangad) with caretaker to doing the day-to-day duty. It is enough to fulfill the vacuum of power in the Army as constitution has noted to regulate it. In fact, Soekarno has appoint Maj. Gen. Pranowo to represent Yani as caretaker, but many of the Army officers refused the appointment and Pranowo just like symbol that later delusional.
Soeharto enter to the stage of power. There are so many controversial version during the appoint ofMaj. Gen. Soeharto to became Pangkopkamtib. As Pangkostrad (Army-Strategic Reserve-Chief-of-Staff), Soeharto ought to obey the supreme commander and accept the command under Maj. Gen. Pranowo, but in the reality he refuse and -utilize his own clique network- provoke the majority Army officers to stand up to the line to support him.[6]
Soekarno doesn’t have any choice in the chaotic situation like thus time, so he give the Pangkostrad Maj. Gen. Soeharto with a wider authority that passing-over the real job that Soeharto should take over. This is a psychological warfare between Army (Soeharto clique) and Soekarno, utilize the Army intelligence network to support Soeharto. The Pangkopkamtib founded in October 10, 1965. It is too odd, because Soeharto accept the Supersemar in 11 March 1966. [7]
With the position of Pangkopkamtib, the main duty of Soeharto is to take any action he felt necessary for the country on behalf of Soekarno. But in the reality, Pangkopkamtib and Supersemar became tool to transfer the authority, transfer of sovereignty. Soon and possible, Soekarno’s role in the political realm delusional.
The Formative Period: Building a Power Base in Indonesia
AFTER MONTH of intensive psychological warfare between Soekarno and the Army, on March 11, 1966, Soekarno finally authorized General Soeharto, then Commander of the Army, as trusted officers after the murdered of Yani in the tragedy of 30 September, to take any action he felt necessary for the country on behalf of Soekarno. The first action Soeharto took was to disband the PKI (Indonesia’s Communist Party). With no PKI and a weak of Soekarno, the Military stood unchallenged on the stage of Indonesian politics.
Using his position as the undisputed leader of the Army folowing of the abortive coup of -public well known- the leftist officers in the presidential palace guard in association with the leaders of the communist party, Soeharto consolidated his power over the military. Soeharto apparently learned valuable lessons from the previously experiences of General A. H. Nasution -the most important military leader of 1950s and early 1960s- especially from Nasution’s unsuccessful efforts to control the heavily politicized Armed Forces during Soekarno’s Guided Democracy.[8]
In 1967 Soeharto started to reorganize the Armed Force by downgrading the services chief of staff, eliminating their power to command their troops, disbanding their intelligence sections as well as their planning, budged, political section, and reducing their elite troops.
THE SOPHISTICATED of Soeharto as an administrator and master spies to create domestic stability is about craft the intelligence services. In the nature of war, intelligence same with sniper. They silent and deadly. In the battle of war, the strategy to win the battle (especially to collapse the opponent morals), in the first priority by Sniper is destroy the sniper personnel (counter-sniper) and second destroy the sub-machine operator/missile facility and later catch/kill the platoon commander. It’s known as the priority attack. So the first time to erected the new administration of the New Order, especially in the security sector, it is important to use the counterintelligence tactics, with disband the Soekarno’s intelligence services BPI (Biro Pusat Intelijen—Centre Intelligence Bureau).[9]
BPI under Soebandrio (also Deputy I Prime-Minister and Foreign Minister) is a second generation of intelligence services in the post-independence era. Before the existence of BPI, in the pre-independence, the father of Indonesian intelligence, Colonel Zulkifli Lubes craft the intelligence community and founded BI(Badan Istimewa—Special Services). BI not long serves the secret mission. Which the low experiences and unskilled agent, BI changed into BRANI (Badan Rahasia Negara Indonesia—Indonesian State Secret Services). This replacement solidly the Services as a part of defense and security element as tool for sake the independence struggle.[10]
As a responses to the BRANI as combat intelligence, which influences with military dominance, the Department of Defense under Amir Sjarifuddin build Badan Pertahanan B—Defense Service Number B, which reflects of civilian wonder’s in the realm of Military dominance to the Services. But, with this new fusion, the Military wing, also afraid, because Syarifudin is a leftist, which represent the left-wing interest and had a secret agenda to put the military in the peripheral. So in the Armed Forces Headquarters build BISAP (Biro Informasi Angkatan Perang—Armed Forces Information Bureau) to balance the Syarifuddin influences. This is a condition where the military still want control the Services. [11]
IN 1947s, When Amir Sjarifuddin become Prime Minister (the cabinet also dominated by the left wings) put the military in peripheral and Indonesia’s sovereign authority has been separated by Renville Agreement (which the implication the Siliwangi Division under Colonel Nasution withdraw from East Java). This condition rising the unsatisfied of the military officer’s, which also decline the Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet. Disappointed because kicked from His position, Syarifudin joint the hardliner leftist wing’s (Communist Party) in Madiun and planed to rebel the Hatta’s Cabinet in Yogyakarta, that’s known as “Madiun Affairs”. The rebellions are fault and many of the leftist elites arrested and it is the first blunder by the leftist in the modern Indonesia.
The defeat of leftist wing’s in the Madiun Affairs are implied the lack of leftist element in the Intelligence Services. Soon, the Badan Pertahanan B disband and the function of state intelligence roles by combat intelligence where dominated with the Army Intelligence personnel. With the lack of leftist element in the state intelligence, this condition make a chance to the elites military intelligence (Army) to make a technical cooperation with the US intelligence agency (CIA). The cooperation is to endure the Indonesian interest to be less dependent with the socialist nation. The point is a secret mission to gain Indonesia not fall into communist state.[12]
After Soekarno consolidated his power and amendment the constitution into 1945 Constitution in the 1959, a new intelligence services are needed to build under appoint of President. With the dominance of military intelligence, this is a difficult era of Soekarnos’s administration to build a single and coherent coordinator of Intelligence Services with a central command to take a single services to maintain the duty of intelligences, there is to obey the President’s will. So in the first, he must put a trusty a “Soekarno Man’s” or a loyalist on behalf Him in the new intelligences bureau. The appointment of Soebandrio as Soekarno loyalist maybe affected by the nature of political realm that Soekarno as civilian want put a civil officer as new intelligence director to keep the Army stay on the path way and not to interfere the political affair like what Nasution does.
After the long and various intrigue within the intelligence community, Soebandrio build a new fusion intelligence offices named BPI and headed the services to fulfill the president interest. All of the intelligence community transferred to BPI, including Saipan Alumni. The military intelligence also fusion into BPI, although the elites of Army Officers disappointed. It is mean, that there is only one authorized intelligence services in this period. In the Soekarno’s era, when the pendulum of foreign policy and homeland security move to the left, BPI politicized because Soebandrio hired and take the intelligence officers from the leftist. Although not all BPI officers is communist (or communist sympathizer) but in the march of institutionalized intelligence services became difficult. The officers lack the energy and professionalism because they roles as tool of regime (political affiliation) not as tool of state.[13]
As the intelligence services, BPI lack of early detection and late to analyze the situation. The friction within Army and the rise of Soeharto are less became main interest of BPI officers, in addition they also not understand the nature of global politics. It is time when the Cold Wars rise in the peak. The war of silence between USA and Uni Soviet are the wars of ideas. The wars of influences. The USA had interest in Indonesia not fall into communist influence. In the global context, the politics of NASAKOM placed Soekarno’s administration in the left position. It is not good for the foreign policy of Indonesia’s non-aligned movement, neither to the US interest.
With the political of containment, USA spread the penetration and covert action in many third world countries. The case of Allan Pope, an American Pilot who helps the PERMESTA rebellion and planning to murder Soekarno is the worst (failure) covert action. In the other case, the invitation of Gilchrist document indicates that something doesn’t work done in the elite Army officers.[14]
IN THE EARLY PERIOD of New Order, Soeharto disband BPI and create the new intelligence institution clear from communist influences named KIN (Komando Intelijen Negara— State Intelligence Command) headed by Maj. Gen. Sudirgo (former head of provost military-police intelligence). On May, 22 1967 KIN changed named into BAKIN (Badan Koordinator Intelijen Negara—State Intelligence Coordinating Body). But, Soeharto feel that Sudirgo quietly is Soekarno sympathizer. It is not good. So Soeharto fired Sudirgo and replace him with Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono. The reorganization and depolitization of the Armed Force and Intelligence Services is important to erect the New Order and to get out the political opponent of Soeharto.
Following this reorganization and depolitization, Soeharto entered the 1970s as the undisputed military and political leader. But it was precisely at this time as well that two of his lieutenants, Major General Ali Murtopo and General Soemitro entered the stage as competing powers. Ali Murtopo from Soeharto‘s own Diponegoro division in Central Java, was a long time subordinate who for many years had served as trusted intelligence officer. He occupied no significant military position after Soeharto took over the army, but was always on call as a political operator and adviser, together with other member of small group confidantes known as Aspri (Asisten Pribadi—Personal Assistant). In the early of 1970s there is a small reorganized BAKIN office with the adding of Deputy III and the office of Opsus.
Murtopo also headed a litle unit and elite operation called Opsus (Operasi Khusus—Special Operation). As non conventional and core-specialist unit, Opsus had a wider authority and irregular task to screening and doing covert operation including infiltration and propaganda to the alleged hardliners movement to maintain the status quo of Soeharto’s administration. As deputy of BAKIN and Aspri, Murtopo had direct line to Soeharto and doesn’t have obligation to give report BAKIN Chief or even to the Commander of Armed Force. In some case it placed Sutopo Juwono as BAKIN Chief doesn’t have authority more than Murtopo did. Slowly and certainly, Sutopo Juwono just a shadow under Murtopo influences. But in different situation, it makes a friction with the Deputy of Armed Force Commander, General Sumitro.
Soemitro, an East Javanese from the Brawijaya military division based in Surabaya, was the Deputy Armed Force (Wapangab) and Commander (Panglima) of the martial law-like Command for Restoration and Security (Kopkamtip) in the early seventies. The conflict between Sumitro and Ali Murtopo was a clash between two strong personalities in their competition to be closer to the center of power, Soeharto. Their competition ended in a huge riot that engulfed Jakarta during the visit of Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in mid January 1974. This tragedy known as Peristiwa Malari. A little more than a month after the riot, on March 6, Sumitro asked Soeharto to relieve him from his position as Deputy Armed Forces Commander. On March 15, Soeharto approved the resignation, which ended Soemitro’s military career. The office of Aspri was abolished on the same day that Soemitro was dismissed as Pangkopkamtib. Unlike Soemitro, Murtopo continued to serve Soeharto, although his importance slowly diminished.
After dispensing with Soemitro and Ali Murtopo, in the mid-seventies Soeharto restored his full control of ABRI. Officers occupying important positions in the military were officers whose loyalty was trusted by Soeharto. He appoint two officers where very closed from long time, this was General L.B. Murdani and General Yoga Sugama. Soeharto recalled Yoga Sugama from Ambassador Post in Yugoslavia to become the Head of BAKIN. In Before the replacement of BPI into KIN, in the Army training center have institution named PSiAD (Pusat Psikologi Angkatan Darat—Centre of Army Psychology) owning by MBAD (Markas Besar Angkatan Darat—Army Headquarters) to balancing the BPI under Soebandrio as military intelligence.
Pararel with the screening of BPI from communist element, The Department of Defense and Security (Dephankam) build Pusintelstrat (Pusat Intelijen Strategis—Centre of Strategic Intelligence) with staff from former PSiAD training centre. Pusintelstrat headed by Chief G-I Hankam Brig. Gen. L.B. Moerdani. These positions keep by Moerdani until he became Commander in Chief (Pangab). In this era, the military intelligence have operational intelligence body named Satgas Intelijen Kopkamtib—Kopkamtib Intelligence task. In the 1980s, Pusintelstrat and Satgas Intel Kopkamtib mergered into BAIS (Badan Intelijen Strategis ABRI—Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency)
In the era of Sutopo Juwono, BAKIN has Deputy II under Colonel Nicklany Soedardjo, the Military Police officer (POM) graduate from Fort Gordon, USA. In the early 1965s, Nicklany build POM intelligence unit, there is Detasemen Pelaksana Intelijen (Den Pintel) POM [Detachment of Intelligence Task]. Officially, Den Pintel POM changed into Satuan Khusus Intelijen (Satsus Intel—Intelligence Special Unit), and then in early 1976s become Satuan Pelaksana BAKIN (Satlak—BAKIN Task Force). In 1980s, Satlak BAKIN changed named into Unit Pelaksana (UP) 01. UP-01 often called Unit Pengintai 01 (Surveillance Unit of 01). This is known because the embryo of UP-01, Satsus Intel, is a leading counterintelligence unit. In the peak of Cold War, Satsus Intel is a distinguish intelligence body that have a counterpart with the world-class intelligence services like CIA (USA), MI-6 (British) and many more. The counterpart including intelligence gathering about Soviet spies and frequently the foreign partner of Satsus Intel give the facility such as bug-telephone and other reconnaissance equipment.
In the era of Yoga Sugama, he had important role to develop BAKIN into leading counterintelligence unit with extensive cooperation, although in the grass-root his roled often friction with Moerdani that became his deputy in BAKIN. The reason is Moerdani as BAIS Chief,priorities the BAIS as task force of every information that he got. The BAIS always leading task of the every information’s that come from BAKIN. In the name of Kopkamtip (which were Moerdani also the Commander) Kopkamtib personnel (with core BAIS) step ahead than BAKIN because as combat intelligence they trained well and had a better experience than BAKIN intelligence agent. This competition resulted the frustated Yoga in the era of 1980s asked Soeharto to relieve him from his position as BAKIN Chief. Soeaharto accept the resignation and Moerdani as single powerful commander rise to the peak after no competitor in the field of secret agency.
Intelligence as Instrument of Fear
The fear created by intelligence apparatus is a dominance realm in the political life in Indonesia. Not only to the political realm, but also in the social life, or even in the private area. This is a consequence of the massive-power-accumulation in the security sector to keep the status quo. Intelligence services provide a political estimate by analyzes the socio-political situation and political development. The agency disseminated their field agent to the society and collect information as much as possible. The real duty, for the Services, not only for the neither field agent nor analyst, is to craft the information and produce the “foreknowledge” intelligence product which useful for the User.
The President as Chief-of-States, in some position represent of the end user. In this position, the making of information is to develop and supported the end user to use the information as instrument of the decision-making process. But, Indonesia’s Intelligence Services in the Soeharto era is a body without lawful legitimating. This condition maybe as impact during the formative era when the duty to defense the country are in the strained situation. The Author noted that in the first formative era, when Soeharto is a Commander of extra judicial martiall-law Kopkamtib and the chief of KIN. After he consolidated his power, he put the trusty’s person in the inner circle of his power to the strategic position. Both in State Intelligence and in the Kopkamtib.
The authority of both extra judicial institutions is wider to the regions. With the build of Laksusda (Pelaksana Khusus daerah—Regions Special Task) or Litsus (Lembaga Penelitian Khusus—Special Research Institute) to screening and monitoring the ex communist sympathizer’s and political opponent, both from the Left or Right wing. This function and scope are supported by ad hoc institution like Kasospolda (Kepala Sosial Politik Daerah—Chief of Region Sosial Politics) to keep the status quo and security stability with the concept of teritorrial command by off-shore the military district or regions police into the level of village (Babinsa).
To maintain the vote-gathering, after fusion many party into only two gray party and one Golkar (like a group-work of anti communist base) the apparatus of intelligence services off-shored function by State Intelligence, Kopkamtib and others Ad Hoc institution monitoring the political participation and general election. The trial of election also held in the government office and Golkar must be win. If there is a critical voice questioning the single voters, the Services (with military and police personnel) uses the violence apparatus to dismiss the critical element that potential became future threat of the Soeharto’s New Order. [15]
More than an ordinary apparatus, when General L.B. Moerdani became Pangkopkamtib, according various source, he believed build a Killer Squad named Petrus (Penembak Misterius—Mysterious Shotter) to reduce the criminality and to make a terror for the regime opponent so the security able to control. The Petrus until now still mysterious and can not bring along the court. Besides that, the intelligence personnel also infiltrated into mass organization, religious organization, until youth and education institution.[16]
As we see in the earlier part above, Soeharto rise in the peak because as a master spy, he uses the intelligence instrument to raise the Presidential chair. He also utilizes intelligence as instrument of fear to keep the New Order status quo. Ironically, his decline in the earlier is a late anticipation of the situation analysis, because he fired his best intelligence officer in the 1989s. L.B. Moerdani, a loyalist that known of “Soeharto’s golden son” fired because he questioning the sentry duty of the Soeharto’s children business family. More than that, Soeharto feel acute phobia, learning in the early of 1966s he replaces Soekarno as President of Indonesia because he consolidate his intelligence personnel’s. Soeharto was afraid Moerdani doing same action to Him.
This is very ironic because Moerdani is a true loyalist. Post Moerdani put in the box (which previously after had position in the Armed Force Commander and Minister of Defense) he put just president adviser a position like Nasution in the 1964 era. Tour of duty, to secure the President position from the rising stars that potentially threat the Presidential Chair. With the lack of democratic framework of the scope and function the intelligence services, and with the successor system not free and fair, many of the observer in thus era believe the cyclical historic of end Soeharto as same with the end of Soekarno, where the lack of solid civilian middle class, the military will enter the stage of central power. And Soeharto quietly became afraid with his junior Mordant.
Post Moerdani put in the Box, BAIS that supported Kopkamtib transferred into narrow institution and changed name become BIA (Badan Intelijen ABRI —ABRI’s Intelligence Agency) as a movement known “de-Moerdani-sasi” to dismiss the Moerdani influences in the Armed Forces and military intelligence. Besides that, Laksus replaced with narrow Bakorstanas as a response of the civil protest and indication of democratization wave impact in Indonesian life. This small reorganized intelligence services still had a problem, because the democratic framework is not a basic foundation and the function just calculate the effectiveness of the section. In spite of that, the lack of coordinator between state intelligence, strategic intelligence, until the judicial and crime intelligence like court and police intelligence agency still difficult to solve. The Soeharto’s intelligence service with the various and dynamic role has colored the journey of security sector in the Indonesia. The sector that in the future must put under civilian supremacy, and serve the country. Not serve the regime. []
OKTA UNDANG-SUHARA, Currently Student on the Political Theory at the Department of International Relations, UPN “Veteran” Yogyakarta.
[1] The Intelligence Analysis is not about the conspiracy theory. Its focus to the genealogy of military and study of the compartments (task force institutionalization) of intelligence services. In brief, it’s about utilized the intelligence institution and the relation of intelligence community as instrument of research.
[2] See Salim Said, Soeharto’s Armed Forces: Problem of the Civil Military Relation in Indonesia, (Jakarta, Sinar Harapan, 2006) p. 13
[3] For further formative the “Middle Way” principle, see :A. H. Nasution, Tongak-Tongak Dwifungsi (Jakarta, Mimeo, 1981) p.17
[4] To see the rivalry of Nasution and Yani, see the Autobiography of Soebandrio in the G 30 S Movement: Kesaksianku tentang G30S ( Jakarta: Anonym, 2005,). P.6-11.
[5] Soebandrio, Kesaksianku, Ibid p.23
[6] Ibid p.25
[7] The document noted the “Pangkopkamtib” spelling is a radiogram from KAS KOTI to the Commander of Kostrad with the record of T-0265/G-5/1965 number. The sender is Captain (Inf) Soejarwo. But if used reference of Surat Keputusan No: KEP-042/Kopkam/7/1967 Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Darat, as a Commander of Kopkamtib signed by Soeharto excerpted in the clause “remembering” that the basicof Kopkamtip foundation is reference the to the Surat Keputusan Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi ABRI/Panglima Besar Komando Operasi Tertinggi bernomor 179/KOTI/1965 tertanggal 6 Desember 1965. See: Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Himpunan Surat-Surat Keputusan/Perintah Jang Berhubungan Dengan Kopkamtib 1965 s/d 1969, issued by Sekretariat Kopkamtib (without year), p. 126-127.
[8] Salim Said, Soeharto, p.69
[9] The previously of Intelligence sections during Soekarno era is BPI (Biro Pusat Intelijen—Centre Intelligence Bureau) headed by Soebandrio which also deputy of Prime Minister (Waperdam I), and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Intelligence community of BPI in the Subandrio is a fusion of military intelligence (from three elements of the Armed Forces) and the element of civilian of the Foreign Ministry. It’s first time when Soebandrio had unifying intelligence community in the one office. See: Kenneth Conboy, INTEL: Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence Service, Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2004
[10] Zulkifli Lubis, as the first intelligence officer graduate from Nakano’s School of Intelligence in Serang (under education of Japanese occupation) was had experience as field agent in the foreign areas such as Singapore.As the first officer, he founded a basic structure and tradition in the post independence intelligence community. The second generation (before BPI) of intelligence officer trained in Saipan Island by US military and CIA officers. Some graduate from Saipan are withdraw to BPI under Soebandrio in the Guided Democracy era.On the Nakano School, see Stephen C. Marcado, The Shadow Warrior of Nakano, (Washington DC: Brassey’s Inc: 2002) p. 239.
[11] The rivalry between Zulkifli Lubis and Syarifuddin implied that the faction among intelligence services. Which the left wing want disband the military intelligence because they fell that military inclined to the fascism and want to dominance the early Indonesian political realm. The important thing that Author noted, as Minister of Defense, Amir Sjarifuddin wish to control the military with the civil supremacies, there is to put Armed Forces Headquarters under Department of Defense. See Kenneth Conboy, INTEL, p 28
[12] Hariyadi Wirawan, “Evolusi Intelijen Indonesia” in the Andi Widjajanto (et, all) Reformasi Intelijen Negara, (Jakarta, PACIVIS UI: 2005) p. 31
[13] The reason of why BPI recruits the “particular” informant and civil field agent from civilian is to balance the military intelligence (combat intelligence). This genealogies could be traced back in the early of intelligence formation during the Amir Sjarifuddin as Minister of Defense (and later become Prime Minister in the Indonesia’s democratic liberal era) see T. Hari Prihartono dan Yandry K. Kasim, “Intelijen Pertahanan: Tinjauan Literatur dan Perspektif Historis Indonesia” in the Andi Widjajanto (et. all) Negara, Intel, dan Ketakutan, (Jakarta, PACISVIS UI : 2006) p.53
[14] For further CIA’s secret operation in South-East Asia in the mid 1950-1965s, see Kenneth Conboy & James Morison, Feet to the Fire (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press: 1999).
[15] For further detail’s of intelligence infiltration and the control of media and film, see Stanley YAP,“Intelijen, Sensor dan Negeri Kepatuhan” in the Andi Widjajanto (et. all) Negara, Intel, dan Ketakutan, Ibid, p.228
[16] For further Petrus “The Killer Squad”, see : Edwin Partogi dan Usman Hamid, “Mereformasi Negara Intel Orde Baru: Kasus Penembak Misterius Era 1980an”, in the Andi Widjajanto (et. all) Negara, Intel, dan Ketakutan, Ibid, p. 192
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